Elections and Public Management Centred on Projects

OpenGov3 Whitepaper

Edition 2.1 | 2 November 2026 | English

Victor BP • Proposal for a Depersonalised Model

Overview

OpenGov3 proposes to develop a new model for elections and public management that is depersonalised and centred on projects. The proposal connects the democratic choice of priorities and projects with responsibility for their implementation. Teams, resources, commitments and outcomes must be open to scrutiny. The aim is to strengthen people's autonomy and make the exercise of power verifiable and accountable.

This document presents the model's reference cycle, its values, the institutional decisions that remain open and the criteria for formulating, comparing, implementing and evaluating projects. Civic understanding, sources and monitoring tools support this work and the participation of those who agree, offer criticism or propose alternatives.

The model is under development. Rules for voting and representation, team selection, resource allocation, oversight and transition require their own study and validation. Experimental instruments are examined separately. The proposal does not amount to an electoral system in operation, an approved reform or a fully specified national budget.

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Contents

Core reading for citizens, researchers and public management professionals. Numbered references allow readers to check the sources. Examples identified as hypothetical explain the method.

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The reference text is in Portuguese. The English, Spanish, Russian and German editions correspond to the same version and retain the reference identifiers.

1 The OpenGov3 Proposal

OpenGov3 proposes a new model for elections and public management that is depersonalised and centred on projects. Its central idea is to connect the democratic choice of proposals with responsibility for their implementation: defined problems, comparable alternatives, explicit resources, identified teams and outcomes subject to verification. This edition develops the direction set out in the 2025 whitepaper. [2]

Depersonalising means reducing the extent to which political choice depends on charisma, fame and loyalty to a public figure. Debate should focus on problems, proposals and the capacity to carry out the work. People and institutions remain identified, with their responsibilities, conflicts of interest and decisions subject to public scrutiny. The proposal seeks to bring voting closer to what will be done and how it will be monitored.

The founding texts advocate individuality, freedom of thought, responsibility, essential services and constraints on power. These values guide the model and the criteria used to examine it. The essays preserve the author's voice and context; historical opinions and philosophical formulations do not thereby become empirical evidence about groups, countries or policies. [1]

Status of the proposal

Aspect	Scope in this edition
Adopted principles	Democratic choice centred on projects, identifiable responsibilities, rights, transparency and review. These are normative commitments of the model.
Open design questions	Voting and representation rules, portfolio composition, team selection and replacement, budgetary authority and institutional transition.
Available evidence	Studies of specific mechanisms and examples explicitly identified as fictional. Evidence about one component does not establish the validity of the complete system.
Validation still required	Comprehension and inclusion, record integrity, fiscal and legal feasibility, governance and performance in bounded applications.

How the Model Is Organised

The cycle below describes the intended operation and organises the design questions. Its stages need to be examined together, because selecting a project affects resources, responsibilities and services.

- Proposal: present projects and portfolios with the problem, intended beneficiaries, alternatives, outputs, targets, costs, funding sources, timelines, risks and proposed teams.

- Comparison: make differences in objectives, quality, reach, full cost, dependencies and consequences visible, with sources and uncertainties accessible to voters.
- Democratic choice: enable voters to compare and prioritise projects with knowledge of the proposed teams and implementation plans. The relationship between voting, representation and the authority to implement depends on rules yet to be developed.
- Taking responsibility: define who decides, finances, implements, verifies and is accountable, with powers and resources that match the commitments made.
- Implementation and monitoring: record stages, spending, changes, justifications and evidence, while preserving service continuity and the possibility of oversight.
- Evaluation and revision: examine outputs and effects, hear challenges, correct errors and make the history of decisions and outcomes useful for subsequent choices.

Open Design Decisions

Connecting voting, authority and budgets is a central task in developing OpenGov3. The model needs to offer public, comparable answers to the following questions:

- How would voting on projects relate to representation, mandates and decision-making powers?
- How should teams be selected and responsibilities distributed among those who propose, finance, implement and oversee projects?
- How should interdependent projects, competing priorities and budget constraints be coordinated while maintaining ongoing services?
- How can accessible participation, data protection, opportunities to challenge decisions, rights and constraints on power be ensured?
- How should alternative rules be compared and a transition planned that is compatible with institutional powers and service continuity?

Civic Understanding for Model Development

OpenGov3's texts, studies and tools support the development and examination of this proposal. Civic understanding helps each person understand institutions, compare projects, recognise costs and consequences and hold those exercising power accountable. People should be able to benefit from this work, disagree with the model and remain fully included in the conversation. Understanding and participation do not require political agreement with the author.

Research, public monitoring and possible activity through a political party involve distinct responsibilities. An organisation seeking power faces additional conflicts of interest when assessing competitors. The possibility of a political party remains open to investigation; it is neither a prerequisite for developing or discussing the model nor an institution established by this document.

The guiding question is: does this decision expand people's real freedom, respect their rights and use available resources responsibly? Answering requires attention to individual lives, social coexistence and the durability of outcomes.

2 Values and Limits on Power

Values guide the choice of objectives and must be made explicit. Evidence helps examine the means, their effects and their limitations. A favourable indicator does not remove a conflict of rights or determine, on its own, how much priority a society should give each objective.

Value	Implication for the Project
Individual dignity	Rights and human worth do not depend on income, productivity, opinions or scores.
Autonomy	Expand people's real opportunities to understand, choose, work, learn and care.
Individual responsibility	Consider choices and consequences without overlooking starting conditions and external risks.
Public accountability	Require explanations and accountability from those who make decisions about resources and rights.
Freedom of thought	Allow doubt, criticism, access to sources and the revision of beliefs.
Pluralism	Address differences in priorities with respect and arguments that can be examined.
Democracy and limits on power	Preserve participation, representation, checks, rights and alternation in power.
Ethics and impartiality	Apply the same criteria to allies, funders, founders and opponents.
Understandable transparency	Explain decisions, money and outcomes in verifiable terms.
Respect for scarce resources	Consider full costs, alternatives and opportunities forgone.
Initiative and competition	Facilitate creation and market entry without confusing entrepreneurship with privilege.
Solidarity and protection	Address severe deprivation and also support those who need long-term care.
Learning and self-correction	Revise instruments when evidence or experience reveals shortcomings.
A long-term perspective	Consider service continuity, the environment and future generations.

Autonomy depends on relationships, services and institutions. Public education, accessible primary health care, security and infrastructure are priorities in the original texts. A need for permanent support does not diminish a person's dignity. Encouraging economic initiative also requires recognition of paid employment, care work, science and other life choices. [1]

Efficiency must include quality, distribution and the time required of citizens. A procedure that is inexpensive for the administration may transfer queues, travel and risks to families. The assessment must show these costs and the available alternatives. Democratic legitimacy and rights place limits on the pursuit of outcomes.

3 How to Examine a Proposal

Developing the electoral model and comparing projects require identifying the kind of claim under discussion. This distinction prevents a simulation from being presented as a certain prediction or a political preference from being hidden inside a formula.

Type of Claim	Requirement for Analysis
Value	Justify the principle and acknowledge conflicts with other values.
Observed fact	State the source, definition, period, coverage and unit.
Causal explanation	Examine what would probably have happened without the intervention.
Hypothesis	Make the expected mechanism and a way to test it explicit.
Choice	Show alternatives, constraints, criteria and the responsible authority.

Eight Working Questions

- What problem is being addressed and how was it identified?
- Who experiences it, and which differences in geography, income, age or needs matter?
- What already happens today, and which institutions have the authority to act?
- How would the intended change produce the outcome?
- What evidence supports that expectation, and how far do the conclusions it supports extend?
- What are the costs of implementation, operation, maintenance, transition and risk?
- What is the best available alternative, including improving what already exists?
- What outcome or problem would require the intervention to be corrected, stopped or replaced?

Appraisal must compare options under equivalent objectives and constraints. Proposals that provide different services, serve different populations or omit recurring expenditure are not directly comparable. The Green Book offers a methodological reference for examining alternatives, the distribution of effects and uncertainty; applying it in Brazil requires local data and context. [3]

A Source and the Scope of a Conclusion

A law allows a rule to be checked; an institutional webpage allows the description of a programme to be checked. Neither, on its own, demonstrates adequate implementation or a causal effect. An evaluation may support a conclusion in the context studied while leaving questions about another place, period or scale. A simulation reveals the consequences of the assumptions adopted.

Each relevant claim should retain its original passage, date and location. The record must distinguish explicit source content, reproducible calculations, interpretation and missing information. Missing data must remain visible. Do not fill in budgets, deadlines or responsibilities through unstated inference.

Useful criticism identifies the point of disagreement, the evidence that could resolve it and what remains a choice between values. A review may conclude that an instrument should be retained, modified, tested, left open or abandoned.

4 Projects and Verifiable Commitments

In the proposed model, projects need to be presented as verifiable public commitments. A public commitment is a defined obligation or intention that can be linked to a source, responsible parties and implementation conditions. A construction project, an ongoing service and regulatory reform require appropriate forms of description and monitoring. Organising work around projects must keep the ongoing obligations of operation, maintenance and service provision visible.

The record below allows proposals to be compared before a choice is made and commitments to be monitored afterwards. It does not fill gaps in the source or automatically attribute to an actor the power to fulfil the commitment. A legislator may submit a proposal without controlling its approval; a municipal government may depend on funding or authorisation from another level of government.

Field	Information to Record
Problem	Identified need and baseline diagnosis.
People and place	Affected population, coverage and relevant differences.
Value protected	Purpose and rights involved.
Alternatives	Options compared and reasons for the choice.
Commitment	Output or obligation, scope, target and deadline where defined.
Responsible parties	Who decides, funds, implements, verifies and is accountable.
Resources	Initial and recurring costs, sources and uncertainties.

Field	Information to Record
Dependencies	Authorisations, people, systems and other necessary outputs.
Evidence	Original document, data, method and limitations.
Outcomes	Expected change in people's lives and how to measure it.
Monitoring	Status, milestones, deviations, explanations and action taken.
Challenges	Channel, response procedure and correction history.

Four Distinct Statuses

A proposal identifies what someone intends to do. An undertaken commitment requires a responsible party and defined conditions. Recorded delivery requires evidence of implementation. An evaluated outcome requires examination of the effect produced, with a method and its limitations. These statuses describe different evidence; they are not an automatic percentage of progress.

A commitment may change, be suspended or lose the conditions needed for implementation. The history must record the reason and preserve previous versions. If no evidence of progress is found, the record must state what was sought, which sources were searched and the search cut-off date; this does not, in itself, prove inactivity, fraud or failure to fulfil the commitment.

Comparing Without Distortion

The unit must be consistent. Splitting one promise into ten items and another into just one can artificially change any completion percentage. A future register must publish rules for splitting, grouping, excluding and linking commitments, and test whether independent reviewers reach similar classifications. Documentary completeness and policy quality are different assessments.

5 From Implementation to Evaluation

For the choice of projects to translate into public management, commitments require institutional authority, a team, a budget, procurement where applicable, data, coordination and maintenance. The chain must identify who controls each stage and which decisions depend on third parties. The same requirement applies to OpenGov3's own capacity to keep information up to date.

From Activity to Effect

An activity is work undertaken; an output is a product or service provided; an outcome is an observed change; causal impact is the portion of change attributable to the intervention. Evaluation must be

planned from the design stage and use a method suited to the question and context. The Magenta Book distinguishes process, impact and value for money evaluation without imposing a single method on every case. [4]

Monitoring must preserve the baseline, the indicator definition, the denominator, and the frequency and quality of the data. Changes in classification and in the population served must appear in the history. Volume targets must be accompanied by measures of quality, distribution and unintended effects, to avoid rewarding an output that merely shifts the problem elsewhere.

A Hypothetical Service Example

Imagine a commitment to reduce the median waiting time from 60 to 45 days within 12 months in a fictional service network. The figures are illustrative. The record would need to define which requests enter the measurement, how cancellations are handled, who remains on the waiting list, the source of the records and responsibility for each stage.

The change amounts to 15 days, or 25% of the initial value. This describes a change in the indicator. Evaluating the service would also require examining the outstanding waiting list, the longest waits, quality and differences between groups. Attributing the improvement to the intervention would require an appropriate comparison and analysis of other changes during the period.

If the target is met by excluding difficult cases, transferring patients without resolving their needs or changing the definition of waiting time, the outcome does not serve the purpose. The protocol should provide for review when such signs appear and keep changes in method visible. No financial saving follows automatically from reducing the number of days.

The same commitment from proposal to review

- Propose and compare: in the example of reducing the wait from 60 to 45 days, compare reorganising the queue, expanding capacity and improving referrals. State the population served and the needs each alternative would leave unmet.
- Finance: present implementation, operation, maintenance and contingencies over the same horizon; identify the budgetary source and necessary authorisation. The example contains no cost figures or confirmed funding. This gap prevents the proposal from being treated as a commitment ready for implementation.
- Take responsibility and implement: identify the network authority, management team, those responsible for procurement where needed and those who verify. Selecting management, choosing suppliers and conducting oversight involve distinct responsibilities; electoral support does not automatically authorise a procurement award.

- Monitor: publish capacity and service milestones, queue records and amounts contracted, accepted and paid in separate fields. None of these figures alone is equivalent to physical progress or better service.
- Amend and challenge: if a dependency is delayed, record the previous version, the reason, alternatives, effects on cost and timing and the authority making the decision. A challenge must receive a reasoned response and allow review without participation by anyone with a conflict of interest.
- Evaluate and decide: at the end of 12 months, assess the median alongside the open queue, the longest waits, quality and the distribution of access. Record whether there is a basis to continue, correct or stop; causal attribution requires the comparison described earlier.

The roles and procedures above form a hypothetical design. The local plan selection shown on the website demonstrates how to compare priorities; it neither records votes nor determines how to convert preferences into authority and budgets. That connection remains an open institutional decision.

Accounts That Must Remain Separate

Social benefit, fiscal savings and available cash are different quantities. Time saved can have social value without releasing cash. Avoided expenditure may not translate into a budget reduction. Donations, tax revenue forgone, borrowing and recurring revenue have different consequences and must be shown separately.

An application in Brazil should present three perspectives: the fiscal outcome and funding sources; distribution across people and groups; and assets, debt and future risks. Transition, maintenance and administration costs must be included. Comparisons over time must state the currency, price base year, inflation, time horizon and discount rate, where used. Uncertain assumptions require scenarios and sensitivity analysis. [3, 5]

The hypothesis of funding new policies through future efficiency gains can only be treated as an available resource once its mechanism, scale, timing and feasibility have been demonstrated. This edition does not present a fully specified national fiscal plan or turn expected benefits into a promise of funding.

6 Governance Through Participation and Information

The model needs to define how democratic choice translates into authority to decide, resources to implement and a duty to account for decisions and actions. Citizens, proponents, implementation teams, funders, responsible bodies and oversight institutions have distinct functions. Team selection

and the allocation of powers depend on public rules, institutional powers and oversight arrangements yet to be developed.

Monitoring, evaluation and auditing should produce information for justified decisions. Procedures for correcting projects, replacing those responsible or resolving conflicts need to provide for a competent authority, public criteria, a response from those involved and review. Targets and indicators inform these decisions; rights, institutional powers and legitimacy remain constraints on institutional design.

In Brazil, the design must respect institutional powers, rights and the principles of public administration. The Constitution, Access to Information Law and General Personal Data Protection Law provide a framework; citing them does not certify the legality of a specific implementation. [9, 10, 11]

Governance of OpenGov3 Itself

The project's credibility also depends on rules that apply to those operating it. An application must identify who selects cases, interprets sources, approves changes and considers appeals. Where there is a conflict of interest, the decision requires review without the interested party's participation and a recorded justification.

For future public monitoring, the proposal is to separate preparation of a record, review and decisions on challenges. This separation should be proportionate to the available team and honestly disclosed. Funders must not be able to buy favourable assessments, conceal corrections or control classifications in which they have an interest.

A material correction should make it possible to identify the previous content, the new wording, the reason, the source and the date. Differences of interpretation and factual errors require different treatment. The published editorial contact is OpenGov3@proton.me. A public corrections register, response deadlines and independent review should only be announced as operational when they have assigned responsibility and actual capacity.

Participation With Defined Influence

Before a consultation, it is necessary to explain which decision is open, who can participate, which resources are at stake and which limits already apply. There must be feedback on contributions accepted and rejected. The OECD guidelines emphasise design, inclusion, feedback and evaluation of the process. An open poll does not automatically represent the population. [8]

Participation must consider people with little time, limited connectivity, disabilities or limited digital familiarity. When a public decision requires broader reach, appropriate forms of participation beyond

the interface will be necessary. Identity authentication, representativeness and legitimacy are different problems; solving one does not solve the others.

Transparency and Data Protection

The proposed design prioritises publishing what is necessary to understand public decisions and resources while protecting personal data. Purpose, legal basis, necessity, retention, access and security must be assessed before collection. Sensitive information should not be entered into immutable public records. The LGPD addresses purpose, necessity, security and data subjects' rights. [11]

Signatures, timestamps and change histories can help verify authorship and integrity. They do not demonstrate that a measurement corresponds to reality. Infrastructure must be selected according to verification needs, cost, interoperability, correction and recovery from failures. Blockchain remains an option to compare with simpler solutions.

Verifying documents and protecting the vote are distinct problems. Any future electoral system would need to specify ballot secrecy, eligibility, coercion prevention, verifiability, challenges and recovery, with independent examination. Recording something on a blockchain does not fulfil these requirements or prove delivery. This edition establishes no voting protocol.

Access and Reading Experience

The interface should provide readable text, keyboard navigation, visible focus, descriptive links and support for magnification. Motion should help users perceive an action and respect their preference for reduced motion. WCAG 2.2 provides guidance on accessibility requirements, but conformance depends on assessment of the implementation. Technical tests should be complemented by real readers, including older people. [12]

7 Learning From Other Experiences

The model's development can draw on mechanisms for participation, evaluation, information and management from other experiences. The useful unit of comparison is a mechanism and its conditions. One country may offer a reference for interoperability, another for evaluation or participation. This does not demonstrate the superiority of its entire political system or validate OpenGov3's proposals as a whole. Institutional sources describe how a system is stated to work; effects require their own evidence.

The United Kingdom and New Zealand

The 2026 Green Book provides guidance on comparing alternatives; the Magenta Book, updated in 2026, provides guidance on evaluation. The New Zealand Treasury's CBAx offers a spreadsheet and a database of values to support cost-benefit analysis. The Treasury itself also considers non-monetised effects, implementation risks and fiscal constraints. The applicable lesson is to make assumptions explicit and judgement open to examination. Monetary values from another country require adaptation before any use in Brazil. [3, 4, 5]

Estonia and Data Exchange

X-Road illustrates a layer for exchange between systems, with signatures, timestamps and logs. The NIIS technical clarification from 2018 distinguishes this architecture from blockchain. The lesson is to separate interoperability, integrity and the choice of infrastructure. This reference does not prove that the source data are true or remove the need for governance, standards and operational capacity. [6]

Singapore and Digital Services

Singpass documentation distinguishes authentication, consent-based sharing of selected data through Myinfo and digital signatures. This separation helps formulate precise requirements. It does not, on its own, demonstrate voting security, representativeness or legal suitability in Brazil. Adaptation depends on rules, data protection, access and alternatives for those unable to use the digital channel. [7]

Results and limits to inform the design

Ceará and Sobral: the historical analysis relates educational improvements to a package of reforms. The case informs investigation of capacity and coordination; it neither isolates one incentive nor validates the electoral model. [15]

Togo: the personal initiative training experiment found persistent benefits, with long-term differences by gender. Follow-up and the distribution of effects need to be included in evaluation. [16]

Benin: assistance increased formalisation without raising sales or profits in the study. Registrations and economic activity require distinct measures; costs and benefits must be compared. [17]

These cases do not estimate the effect of adopting OpenGov3. The selection illustrates design questions, rather than ranking countries. Costs and transferability require their own examination. Expanded profiles, methods and gaps are available at https://opengov3.com/en/paises; the comparative study remains at https://opengov3.com/en/estudos/estado-social.

OpenGov3's expanded study of the welfare state, services and financing retains other cases and their references at opengov3.com/estudos. Choosing an application for Brazil must take account of demographic, fiscal, federal and administrative differences. A promising practice must be compared with alternatives and failures, as well as favourable cases.

8 A Research Agenda for Brazil

The Brazilian agenda provides a field in which to develop and compare projects. The approach examined here combines essential protection, autonomy, economic initiative, competition and public accountability. The ten areas below organise research questions. They do not represent a national package whose costs, responsibilities and effects have already been demonstrated. Each intervention requires a diagnosis, institutional authority, alternatives, funding, transition and evaluation. Competing projects must have space to present other priorities and alternatives.

- Education: learning, critical thinking and educational pathways that expand opportunities.
- Health: effective access, primary care, continuity of care and both perceived and measured quality.
- Care: conditions for those receiving support and those providing care, including permanent needs.
- Income protection: understandable rules, adequate coverage and transitions that avoid abrupt losses.
- Work and portable protection: protection compatible with changes in employment status and diverse career paths.
- Entrepreneurship and productivity: entry, competition, predictability and the reduction of unnecessary obstacles.
- Security and justice: prevention, investigation, protection of rights and accountability within the law.
- Infrastructure, housing and place: quality, access, maintenance and coordination between interventions.
- Public finances, assets and procurement: full costs, asset use, procurement and long-term risks.
- Understandable and interoperable government: understandable information, accessible services and appropriate data sharing.

Guaranteeing, financing, providing, and regulating or evaluating are functions that must be distinguished. Public, private or community arrangements should be examined in terms of access, quality, rights, incentives and oversight capacity. Choosing a provider does not end public responsibility for the purpose.

Research should begin with clearly defined problems and existing institutions. Before proposing new bodies, check whether a change in process, coordination or capacity would solve the problem. Before

expanding benefits, make coverage, withdrawal, funding and distributional effects explicit. Illustrative percentages and international analogies do not replace these checks.

9 Instruments Under Investigation

The instruments in this section are possible ways to support choice and management centred on projects. Each requires its own criteria for usefulness, feasibility and evaluation. Implementation history, for example, can be presented without an aggregate score. Development of the model should allow instruments that do not serve its purpose to be compared, corrected or abandoned.

Delivery Track Record and Score

Time, cost, quality, transparency, impact, satisfaction and compliance are useful dimensions of analysis. The original document gives conflicting weights for impact and compliance in its prose and table. This edition neither silently selects one version nor establishes a validated formula. [2]

The initial proposal is to present separate dimensions, context, resources, actual responsibility and missing data. An aggregate score would only be justifiable after testing for robustness, sensitivity and comparability. Violations of rights or proven fraud must not be offset by good performance on another indicator. Any consequence requires its own rule, review and right of reply. No general score of citizenship or human worth is proposed.

Rebate Social and Joint Financing

Rebate Social is a hypothesis linking private co-financing to benefits associated with verified outputs and savings. The analysis must distinguish the funder, beneficiary, operator and authority granting the benefit. It must address revenue forgone, additionality, distribution, conflicts of interest, the risk of capture and service continuity. [2]

An arithmetically correct calculation does not demonstrate that its underlying basis is real, that the project caused the savings or that they can fund the benefit. Percentages and examples in the original remain historical. A pilot would first require fiscal and distributional modelling, comparison with alternatives and specific legal analysis. A donation must not buy regulatory privilege or influence over evaluation.

Futarchy and Decision Markets

In Robin Hanson’s proposal, political choice defines objectives and a measure of welfare; conditional markets compare the expected consequences of alternatives. The relevant comparison concerns the expected value of that measure. The probability of exceeding a particular threshold is a different

question. Both scenarios are conditional; the unchosen scenario does not become an observed outcome. The design discussed by Hanson includes constitutional limits. [13]

Using a prediction to make a decision can change the incentives of those making predictions. Chen and co-authors demonstrate this problem and study conditions for incentive compatibility in a formal model of decision markets. The result does not establish the infeasibility of all forms of futarchy, nor does it guarantee that money produces accurate information under any design. [14]

For OpenGov3, the research path is first to assess advisory forecasts, resolution criteria, participation, liquidity, manipulation and conflicts of interest. Fundamental rights and legitimacy should not depend automatically on market prices. Futarchy, project prioritisation and the selection of implementers are distinct mechanisms; Score and Rebate Social are not proposals attributable to Hanson.

Institutional Architecture and Technology

The original document associates the model with a structure of 16 ministries, the reorganisation of terms of office and an application for voting and monitoring. These specific designs remain subject to comparison and revision. The central proposal for elections and public management centred on projects should be developed through analysis of institutional powers, coordination, transition, cost, representation and oversight. The same discipline applies to blockchain: choose infrastructure only after defining the problem it needs to solve. [2]

10 Developing the Model

The proposed path brings together research into electoral design, the organisation of public monitoring and civic understanding. Development should make possible rules and the conditions for comparing them explicit, test how well they are understood and examine their consequences. Pilots focused on information and monitoring can help develop parts of the model, with their scope and limits stated.

Stage	Evidence Needed to Proceed
Model specification	The relationship between voting, representation, projects, teams, budgets and oversight described; open decisions and alternatives identified.
Comparison and simulation	Candidate rules examined in scenarios with constraints, interdependencies, risks of exclusion and concentration of power; assumptions and limits published.
Information and monitoring pilots	Limited scope, sources, responsibilities, costs and review criteria defined, without exercising electoral authority; reproducible records and checks.

Stage	Evidence Needed to Proceed
Evaluation and revision	Understanding, access, usefulness, errors, disagreements, costs and incentives examined before expanding the scope.
Institutional application	Institutional powers, public rules, legitimacy, resources, oversight and transition defined by the responsible bodies.

The protocol for each test must define evaluation and review criteria before observing the results. Insufficient data, inconsistent classifications, barriers to participation, unsustainable maintenance costs or errors that harm people require a reduction in scope, a correction to the method or suspension of the stage. Traffic figures and numbers of documents processed do not replace quality, understanding and verifiability.

A successful information pilot demonstrates only what was actually tested. Adopting electoral or public management rules requires a separate institutional assessment and decisions by the competent bodies. OpenGov3's responsibility is to make its model understandable, open to criticism and subject to revision, keeping the choice of projects connected to the capacity to implement them and to accountability.

Minimum protocol for the first information pilot

- Set the scope before starting: choose a problem, territory, period and set of commitments; record inclusion and exclusion criteria. The pilot organises information and monitoring, without exercising electoral authority or delivering services.
- Assign roles: identify coordination, record authorship, review and decisions on challenges; disclose funding, conflicts and replacements. Names, availability and response deadlines must be established before opening the service.
- Specify data and rules: publish the field dictionary, sources, cut-off date and treatment of missing information. Every classification must link to its source passage or record, preserving versions and corrections. Personal data are included only where necessary and protected.
- Test reproducible review: have different reviewers apply the rules to the same set of records; measure agreement, disagreements and corrections. Set an acceptable level and a disagreement procedure beforehand; this edition does not invent a validated threshold.
- Test comprehension and access: ask readers with diverse profiles to find the responsible party, cost, deadline, evidence and uncertainty, and to distinguish a proposal, delivery and outcome. Record barriers, including those encountered with magnification, keyboards and assistive technologies.

- Control cost and harm: record working hours, expenses, delays and the updating cost per record. A material error that harms someone requires immediate correction and review; a privacy failure requires containing the exposure and reassessing the scope.
- Make a public, documented decision: continue only when predefined conditions are met and material failures addressed. Persistent disagreement, exclusion, insufficient data or unsustainable maintenance require correction, a smaller scope or suspension. Publish the decision, its reasons and limitations.

Location, team, sample, budget, timetable and acceptance thresholds still need to be specified. The protocol is a specification for preparing the pilot, not an announcement of operations. Any success will support conclusions about information and monitoring within the scope tested; electoral adoption and public management require their own validation.

Note on This Edition

Edition 2.1 adds the proposal status matrix, connects the service example to implementation responsibilities and decisions, details the information pilot and incorporates three references added since edition 2.0. It preserves the structure and qualifications concerning the Score, Social Rebate and futarchy, without establishing electoral rules or a national fiscal plan. Editions 2.0 and 1.20.15 and the essays remain available as historical records.

Portuguese is the reference text. English, Spanish, Russian and German preserve the version, structure, examples and source numbering. Future changes to content must be recorded in the edition and reflected in the corresponding translations.

Essential Glossary

Political depersonalisation. Organising choice and accountability around proposals and public criteria, while keeping people and institutions identified and accountable.

Project portfolio. A set of projects coordinated according to objectives, resources, dependencies and responsibilities.

Public commitment. A defined obligation or intention that can be linked to a source, responsible parties and implementation conditions.

Counterfactual. The situation that would have occurred without the intervention, estimated using an appropriate method.

Observed outcome. A measured change that may still have multiple causes.

Causal impact. Change attributable to the intervention, within the limits of the evaluation.

Additionality. The portion of the effect that would not have occurred without the mechanism being analysed.

Interoperability. The ability of systems to exchange and use information appropriately.

Audit trail. A history that allows examination of origins, changes, decisions and responsible parties.

Futarchy. A proposal combining the political definition of objectives with conditional markets to compare expected consequences.

References

References inherited from edition 2.0 retain their access date of 22 October 2026. The three references added in this edition were checked on 2 November 2026. Sources support the specified claims; they do not validate OpenGov3 as a complete system. Bibliographic titles remain in their original language.

[1] Victor BP. Textos fundadores do OpenGov3. Author's archive. Sem o indivíduo não temos uma sociedade; Premissas para uma sociedade minimamente saudável; Que Nasça Logo Uma Ideologia Livre; Como seria um Governo ideal. Essays, with the author's context and voice preserved. opengov3.com.

[2] Victor BP. OpenGov3 Whitepaper v1.20.15. 27 October 2025. Original document. Sections 2, 8, 11, 12 and 14. Version preserved separately. opengov3.com.

[3] HM Treasury. The Green Book. 2026. Appraisal of alternatives, costs, benefits, distribution and uncertainty. Chapters 1, 6, 7 and 9. www.gov.uk.

[4] HM Treasury e Evaluation Task Force. Magenta Book Central Government guidance on evaluation. 2026. Edition updated in May. Evaluation planning, process, impact and value for money. Chapters 1 to 3. www.gov.uk.

[5] The Treasury New Zealand. The Treasury's CBAx Tool. Budget 2026. Model and database of values. Section Using CBAx to inform decision-making; version released in November 2025. www.treasury.govt.nz.

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